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The Marital Balance of Power and 
Quid Pro Quo: An Evolutionary 
Perspective 
Kevin B. Kerber 
Department of Psychiatry, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
Although the marital therapy literature recognizes the importance of quid pro quo in 
marital negotiations, there has been little attention to certain important sources of 
power for men and women in that process. This paper will show how parental 
investment, certainty of paternity, patterns of mate preference, intrasexual competi- 
tion, and reproductive status all affect the bargaining positions of men and women. 
Both premarital and marital negotiations will he discussed. Put into a developmental 
perspective, this will help clarify what is at stake in the common sources of conflict 
between the sexes. These considerations form a central part of the socioecology of 
marriage. 
KEY WORDS: Parental investment; Marital conflict; Marital therapy; Reproductive strat- 
egy; Quid pro quo. 
INTRODUCTION 
For both men and women through the centuries, the tribulations of beginning 
and maintaining an enduring sexual relationship have been sources of anxiety, 
pleasure, frustration, perplexity, and humor. In our monogamous society, there 
is an enormous emphasis on marital harmony and stability. Expectations are 
high, and marital failure may be seen as a result of individual psychopathol- 
ogy, such as immaturity, self-centeredness, dependency, poor communication, 
and so on. At the very least, individuals are likely to feel guilt and a loss of 
self-esteem when they fail to have the harmonious relationship “normal” 
people are supposed to have. The loss of self-esteem will be especially acute 
when the conflict is public knowledge and, in the extreme. ends in divorce. 
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With a divorce rate that has risen sharply above historic levels, these 
experiences have become quite common. The negotiations between husband 
and wife have been affected by changes in family structure, in particular by the 
greater educational and occupational independence of women (Glick and Lin 
1986; Blumstein and Schwartz 1983). Since the companionate marriage (one 
based on individual choice and love) has become more frequent during about 
the same period as the rising divorce rate, it is evidently not a means of 
avoiding conflict. 
Despite long-standing cultural norms about the “proper” sex roles in a 
marriage, psychiatrists and marital therapists have found it useful to analyze 
marital negotiations in terms of a quid pro quo (Jackson 1965; Fish and Fish 
1986). With this concept they try to capture the exchange negotiated in a 
marriage by the wife and husband. It will also apply to the development of 
symptoms (such as depression) by one spouse in response to a particular 
balance of power or change in that balance. Fish and Fish assert that the quid 
pro quo is the common element to all the systemic theories of marital therapy 
and that, from this point of view, “the central marital issue is the balance of 
power.” 
Unfortunately, although they recognize that three important domains of 
negotiation have to do with money, sex, and in-laws, they attend little to 
certain influences in these domains. Even a recent “integrative” approach to 
marital treatment (Polonsky and Nadelson 1985) offers no general observations 
or theories about the developmental hurdles faced by men and women in these 
areas. 
The concept of quid pro quo encompasses not only conflicts of interest 
but also the resolution of these conflicts. The reconciliation of individuals after 
intense conflicts is a long-standing feature of primate evolution (de Waal 
1989). Across a variety of primate species, de Waal noted that “The goal of 
conflict resolution is not peace per se; it is the maintenance of relationships of 
proven value.” In this way, “screaming and shouting followed by tenderness 
may actually strengthen a bond, in that the sequence assures both parties of the 
viability of the relationship. We do not trust a ship before it has weathered a 
storm.” .He describes convincingly how the negotiation of conflict and conflict 
resolution draw heavily on important aspects of human affiliative psychology, 
from the cognitive skills needed to plan and form strategy in complex group 
interactions, to empathic understanding of the needs and feelings of others, to 
the emotional rewards of reconciliation. 
It has been suggested that these primate developments were advanced 
further in human evolution by the high degree of economic reciprocity that has 
characterized the human family (Washburn and Lancaster 1968). The hunting- 
and-gathering way of life required a well-developed division of labor, and, 
with it, even greater skills for managing conflicts and maintaining relation- 
ships. 
It will be the goal of this paper to show that a fuller understanding of 
marital conflict is possible when the differing circumstances and developmen- 
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tal challenges of the sexes are considered. This understanding will clarify some 
importance influences on the marital balance of power and the quid pro quo. 
This perspective will draw heavily from recent developments in the application 
of evolutionary theory to human behavior. Nevertheless, I will not assert that 
evolution has shaped any “essential” male or female character or cognitive 
tendencies. Instead, I will attempt the more modest undertaking of trying to 
show how a variety of biological and cultural forces influence the reproductive 
choices men and women make. Even if it were the case that men and women 
were cognitively identical, there are still good reasons to expect that they 
would make different reproductive choices. This argument will proceed from a 
discussion of parental investment, differences in male and female intrasexual 
competition and status, and the costs of infidelity and abandonment, to an 
examination of the consequences of these factors in male/female negotiations 
throughout life. 
PARENTAL INVESTMENT, INTRASEXUAL COMPETITION, 
AND STATUS 
The concept of reproductive strategy helps to see how the sexes may shape 
their behavior with each other. Daly and Wilson (1983) write that “a reproduc- 
tive strategy is a program for the allocation of reproductive effort” and divide 
this effort into mating effort and parental effort. Since men and women differ 
in terms of their reproductive potentials and limitations, they will tend to 
distribute this effort differently and to utilize different strategies, strategies that 
may often be in conflict with one another (Buss 1989a). 
Reproductive strategies are shaped by a variety of biological, ecological, 
and cultural factors. A fundamental biological effect concerns parental invest- 
ment where, as described by Trivers (1972), the sexes have an enormous 
difference in many species. He defines parental investment as “any investment 
by the parent in an offspring that increases the offspring’s chance of surviving 
(and hence reproductive success) at the cost of the parent’s ability to invest in 
other offspring.” For men the minimum parental investment need not necessar- 
ily extend beyond the effort of a brief copulation. For women the minimum 
investment is huge, beginning with the considerable costs of pregnancy, 
delivery, and nursing. The energetic or metabolic commitment alone is great. 
In addition, until quite recently, childbirth was a major source of female 
mortality. A pregnant woman can make no alternative reproductive commit- 
ments, whereas a man may fertilize another partner almost immediately. 
Examining a variety of species, Trivers showed that, in general, the sex 
that invests more will be motivated to be choosier in mate selection while the 
sex that invests less will have to compete for sexual access to them. For most 
species this means that females will evaluate and select mates carefully. It is 
especially important in those species where mates are needed to contribute to 
the continued care of offspring (e.g., human beings). The female will assess the 
quality and character of the male to determine if he is reliable and likely to 
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make the investment of parental effort that will be most beneficial to her 
offspring. Since the female is obligated to make a large parental investment, 
she will have reason to choose a male who will not take advantage of her and 
depart after copulation without further contribution. 
The decision whether to invest or desert is a complex one for both men 
and women, but the dilemma is slightly different for the sexes. As pointed out 
by Dawkins and Carlisle (1976), before deserting the family, each individual 
should weigh the chance of finding another mate and the cost and likelihood of 
raising another child to the level of development (and investment) of the 
current offspring. Past investment matters only to the extent that it reduces the 
need for future investment. It doesn’t matter who provided the past investment. 
However, because of lengthy human gestation and lactation, the male has the 
first opportunity to desert. This makes “female desertion unlikely to be an 
ESS” (evolutionarily stable strategy) (Maynard Smith 1977). In many families, 
extensive paternal investment will greatly improve the survival and later 
success of offspring, and fathers will therefore be motivated to stay. Even 
where this is true, however, when a point is reached where additional paternal 
investment makes little difference to offspring success, the male still finds it 
easier to desert than the mother. This has to do with the ease of finding a mate. 
A woman’s physical attractiveness is likely to decline with age. As will be 
discussed later, a man’s reproductive appeal may increase with age and, since 
men often marry women younger than themselves, they have a larger pool of 
potential mates from which to choose. Hill and Low (1992) have shown how 
the fewer remaining reproductive opportunities for older women influence their 
willingness to “desert” current reproductive opportunities, that is, have an 
abortion. 
Internal fertilization and gestation have another important consequence. 
While women are certain of maternity, men can never be entirely certain of 
paternity. For a species like ours, where children may receive a very large 
investment for many years, men run the risk of investing heavily in a child 
they did not father. Claustration and infibulation of women, as well as a variety 
of other practices, are used to improve certainty of paternity in many human 
groups (Daly and Wilson 1983). A widespread double standard exists for the 
sexes where female sexual freedom is greatly restricted compared to males 
(Betzig 1989). Male sexual jealousy and asymmetrical adultery laws relate to 
cultural rules around the world where a wife’s adultery is a crime and her 
husband is the victim (Daly et al 1982). The male adulterer’s marital status is 
often irrelevant to his punishment. 
Patterns of investment are influenced by various social and ecological 
factors. The avunculate exists in some nonindustrial societies where there is 
low certainty of paternity; men therefore invest more than they would other- 
wise in their sister’s offspring (with whom they are more certain of a genetic 
relationship) (Alexander 1979; Flinn and Low 1986). Ecological features such 
as the distribution and predictability of resources will affect mating patterns 
and competition (Emlen and Oring 1977; Rubenstein and Wrangham 1986; 
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Foley and Lee 1989). In societies operating at or near subsistence level, it will 
be difficult for very many men to achieve sufficient wealth to afford more than 
one wife. As a society becomes wealthier, more complex, and stratified, a 
greater number of men will have the means to afford multiple wives (Betzig 
1982). 
A large majority of human societies around the world permit men to have 
more than one wife (Daly and Wilson 1983). Even in societies where it is 
permitted, though, most men have only one wife, polygamy being reserved for 
the most affluent men. When combined with the tendency for men to marry 
women younger than themselves, this polygamy means that some men-espe- 
cially younger, less affluent and less established men-may be unable to obtain 
a wife at all. This is similar to what exists in many species where there is 
greater female investment and where resources permit some males to obtain 
more mates than other males; there is greater variability in reproductive 
success among males than among females. This may be less true today of 
societies that have passed through the demographic transition and have socially 
imposed monogamy. Nevertheless, it remains true that men are both more 
likely to remain single and to remarry than women (Daly and Wilson 1983). 
Data from 1960 showed that of men in the lowest fifth of income, 30% were 
single; among men whose earnings placed them in the top fifth, only 5% were 
single (Trivers 1985). 
This means that the consequences of success and failure are more extreme 
for men than for women. As in other species, the larger size of males and their 
higher mortality from internal and external causes reflects this steeper compet- 
itive hierarchy (Wilson and Daly 1985). Part of this is the greater male 
propensity for risk-taking and for fights-even to death-over conflict that 
involves the relative status of the two individuals (Wilson and Daly). Such 
fights will likely be more common among men lower in status and who are 
fearful of any encounter that may drop them further, especially if the contest 
and the risk of defeat and humiliation are publicly observed. Since there will 
be fewer ecological settings where differences in status between two women 
will result in a difference in reproductive success sufficient to justify risking 
death, such violence will be rare among women. 
DYNAMICS OF NEGOTIATION THROUGH ADIJLTHOOD 
Premarital Negotiations 
Negotiations between the sexes in adolescence or early adulthood are compli- 
cated by a number of factors. Both sexes are likely to be inexperienced in 
managing the vulnerability and give and take of early courtship. But they 
aren’t just uncertain about the procedures of the process; they also are likely to 
have an imperfect understanding of the value of what they are trading. This 
seems especially likely to be a problem for a young woman, both because of 
dilemmas posed by her sexuality and because of the discrepancy between the 
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great value of her sexuality, her developmental immaturity, and her frequent 
perception of her own lower status. These difficulties are a part-but only 
part-of the reason why, in so many cultures, parents try to control who their 
children marry. 
To understand these problems, one must perceive, as pointed out by 
Symons (1979) that women control the ultimate sexual resource, that is, access 
to their reproductive futures (with all the obligation of maternal investment 
mentioned earlier). He described the situation by saying that sex is a service 
women grant to men of their choosing. A young woman, with her whole 
reproductive life ahead of her, controls this extremely valuable resource. In 
many cultures, families go to great lengths to guard and protect this resource 
and encourage the daughter to be sexually restrained. This will especially be 
the case in cultures where fathers make significant investment in offspring and 
therefore demand high degrees of certainty of paternity. 
Despite the power that this control would seem to grant to young women, 
many of them have difficulty wielding it effectively in their negotiations. If a 
woman comes from a family where women have little power or sons are 
valued more, she may perceive herself to have relatively low status. Even if 
she is attractive and intelligent, she may strike a poor bargain in choosing a 
mate, underselling her true value. Psychopathology may often play a role here, 
as neurosis or very low self-esteem causes inhibition and failure to develop or 
utilize personal strengths interpersonally (compare Johnson 1976). One 
wonders whether some fathers use derogation of daughters as a way of 
controlling their sexuality and autonomy. They may use the same tactic with 
sons but, since sons do not become pregnant, perhaps without the same 
concern over control of specifically sexual behavior. 
Buss (1987, 1989b) has collected a variety of evidence to support what 
has been the pretheoretical observation of many; namely, that wealth and high 
status will have a greater effect on male attractiveness and that physical 
attractiveness will have a greater effect for females. Consistent with this is 
Elder’s (1969) data that physical attractiveness was most predictive of a 
woman’s ability to marry a man of higher occupational status. This was 
especially marked for women of lower social class origins. In effect, such a 
marriage is an exchange between the status a woman possesses by virtue of her 
beauty and the greater socioeconomic status of the man. In such negotiations, 
though, the man is likely to be somewhat older, giving him something of an 
advantage in experience and economic control. 
Even such higher status males will have to be appropriately deferential if 
they wish to gain sexual access. If a woman can use the power she has by 
virtue of her status-whatever its origin-then she is in a position to define the 
conditions under which she will offer that access. There is evidence that it is 
the woman’s attitude that is “usually the major restraining force” on whether a 
couple has intercourse (Peplau et al 1977). Regarding religious backgrounds 
and traditionalism, those same authors wrote that “characteristics of the 
woman were better predictions of whether a couple had coitus than character- 
Marital Balance of Power 289 
istics of the man.” Given her greater minimum parental investment, a woman 
is likely to demand evidence not only of emotional commitment to her but also 
the ability (i.e., wealth) and willingness to invest in her and any offspring. This 
is present in familiar courtship behaviors (e.g., gift giving, deferential chival- 
rous behavior) by which males seek to impress females and ingratiate them- 
selves to them (Buss 1988). 
Reproductive status is determined by both the quality and range of 
alternative potential mates. Most women, especially attractive ones, know a 
large number of men who would be quite willing to have intercourse with 
them. The problem is in finding a man of sufficiently high status who is really 
willing to make a commitment to her. 
For men, the situation is quite different. Young men without wealth or 
occupational status may find no one willing to engage sexually with them. To 
be seen as sexually desirable by women, they may need to compete success- 
fully with other men in some arena. This relates, again, to the steeper male 
status hierarchy and young men’s willingness to engage in more extreme or 
dangerous behavior in order to rise in status over others (Wilson and Daly 
1985). 
Only men of relatively higher status will have the range of potential 
sexual partners that many women will have. Unlike the situation for women, 
there will be relatively few men of such high status that they have large 
numbers of potential partners to whom they may do the “favor” of granting 
sexual access. Only a few of the most visible and successful male athletes, 
musicians, and actors will have such a range of choices (e.g., with women 
seeking such sexual favors known as “groupies”). There will be many more 
women in such a position of higher desirability. This is an important part of 
many young women’s higher reproductive status and power. This difference 
seems to be preserved among those of lowest status as well.1 
Marital Negotiations 
While many of the above considerations continue to play a role after a couple 
has married, there are important changes. Recall that much male deference was 
a response to female control over sexual access. After marriage, while a man 
retains his occupational status and, often, economic control, a woman will 
probably have a harder time withholding sexual access. He may become less 
deferential and more assertive in deciding where money is to be spent, money 
that is often earned largely by him. (Even in our society, men continue to earn 
more than women, even for similar work.) There may be conflict over whether 
money will be spent to enhance his status and goals or hers. 
Given the husband’s desire for certainty of paternity, he may feel threat- 
ened by expenditures that do too much to enhance the wife’s attractiveness and 
lAnecdotally, when I used to consult at a community mental health center with the chronically 
mentally ill, the women--even the least attractive ones-still had to deal with unwanted sexual 
advances. By contrast, the least attractive men seemed to have almost no sexual opportunities. 
290 K. B. Kerber 
status. Toward this same end, he may also try to limit the wife’s social freedom 
and autonomy. In some cultures this is perfectly acceptable. Many Muslims, 
for example, require that women cover their faces and bodies almost com- 
pletely. In a culture like ours, however, this sort of strategy seems likely to be 
used only by men who, for whatever reasons, are very uncertain of their ability 
to retain a faithful wife. In fact, among upper class or upwardly ambitious men, 
there may be considerable effort to enhance the attractiveness of their wives, 
whose beauty is widely seen to be a mark of the man’s high social and 
reproductive status. 
Decisions about when to have the first child present a variety of difficul- 
ties. Of course, given that-even today-birth control is less than perfect, this 
step is often not taken planfully. Nevertheless, it is common to defer this step 
until the resources of the couple are sufficient to successfully rear the child. If 
there is significant marital conflict or if the husband appears uncertain to invest 
appropriately, the wife may wish to postpone childbirth until the future of the 
relationship is more clear. She may feel that having a child will make it more 
difficult for her to leave the husband should the marriage become unsatisfac- 
tory. But the husband may be quite aware of that and insist all the more 
strongly. The couple may try to cement an unstable marriage by having 
children. This attempt to create a common cause for the parents is very risky, 
because it involves a large investment by the wife in an uncertain situation and 
at the same time limits her negotiating power by making it more difficult for 
her to withdraw from the relationship. 
Once they have become parents, both individuals will want to ensure that 
the partner does, in fact, contribute as promised. Since the mother has already 
invested heavily, her best strategy is to try to extract greater contributions from 
her husband. This has at least two purposes. Each increment of investment 
from him will both increase the cost of desertion for him and tend to reassure 
her that he is intending to stay. Such contributions may also increase her 
reproductive success, perhaps by enhancing the health or survival of the child. 
Such matters are common sources of marital conflict. When there is an 
extensive division of labor, it becomes very difficult to arrive at an equitable 
distribution of effort. Both individuals will struggle to establish a high value 
for their own contributions while seeking, perhaps, to attribute a lower value to 
their spouse’s. Each tries to get the other to do more. This will be especially 
important for the woman, whose investment is not only larger, but also more 
difficult to limit. She may seek to evoke guilt in the male by calling up societal 
standards of commitment and contribution. 
Even if both individuals are making significant contributions, those of the 
mother tend to be more directly bestowed upon the child and are likely to 
involve the satisfaction of basic needs (food preparation, personal hygiene, 
clothing, etc.) that are unavoidable and therefore less under her discretionary 
control. Men tend to contribute indirectly by working outside the home for 
money. In this way they have greater discretionary control over their actual 
contribution to the offspring. That men tend to control the economic resources 
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of the family not only gives them more power within that unit but also gives 
them the opportunity to invest elsewhere. Women have quite understandably 
tried to gain greater control over economic resources by also working outside 
the home. This has permitted them to a greater degree of independence and a 
range of opportunities. However, as many mothers working outside the home 
have discovered, this also increases further the size of their investment. Since 
male contributions at home may increase little if at all when the mother takes a 
job (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983) the discrepancy between their contribu- 
tions may only become greater, adding to the dilemma in which the mother 
finds herself (compare Hill and Hill 1990). 
Once she has a child, her options become more limited. Whether or not 
she has any special maternal feelings, a mother stands to lose more-because 
of her greater initial investment-if she were to leave the family. (This is 
consistent with Dawkins and Carlisle (1976); after all, given her large mini- 
mum investment in future offspring, future prospects must be very good 
relative to current prospects to make desertion worthwhile. In other words, it is 
likely to be cheaper and easier for a man to replace current offspring.) The 
more children she has, the more marked this discrepancy. Her reproductive 
status also drops because, with children, her reproductive value to other men 
drops. (There is disagreement on this point; compare Stewart et al. 1985 with 
Glick and Lin 1986.) Other men may be understandably reluctant to enter into 
a relationship where they may have to make significant contributions to 
children of another father and where the woman has already committed a large 
part of her parental effort. If she remains married, as long as she is raising her 
husband’s children and planning continued maternal investment, she retains 
considerable reproductive value to him. After the children leave home, how- 
ever, her reproductive value decreases considerably. Although she may still be 
able to invest in her children in a variety of ways, she may have less leverage 
with her husband. For all these reasons, as well as a likely decline in physical 
attractiveness, a woman’s number of alternative mating opportunities is very 
likely to decrease with age, the drop becoming more marked after about 4.5 
years. 
A man’s reproductive capabilities are not so limited by physical or 
physiologic changes-he may be capable of having children years later than a 
same-aged woman-but by his opportunities to mate. But, recalling the greater 
variability in male reproductive success, the trajectory of a man’s reproductive 
status may fall as well as rise through the life span. Most men start with few 
mating opportunities and low status. This is tolerable because they hope for the 
promise of later success, both at work and with women. For some, this promise 
is fulfilled, and their attractiveness to women may increase with their success. 
Thus, a man who achieves considerable success by age 45 may have more 
sexual opportunity than he had at 20. In contrast to women, his reproductive 
status may rise until fairly late in life. 
On the other hand, some men do not fare so well. Unemployment or other 
occupational or economic setbacks may make them less attractive to women 
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and rob them of any prospect of success for the future. This points to a general 
developmental issue for men at this stage of life. Somewhere between 35 and 
50 years of age, a man can project his trajectory of social success into the 
future and may estimate the probability of sustained or enhanced success. The 
trajectory may appear likely to level off or to begin to decline, and there may 
be no promise of later success or new opportunities to sustain him. Men may 
react to this perception in a variety of ways, with a sense of powerlessness and 
failure, hostility, or anger. 
Of course, the balance of power in a marriage doesn’t depend only on the 
relative reproductive status of husband and wife. Both husband and wife may 
either develop or fail to develop other personal or interpersonal strengths. 
Personality characteristics will certainly affect how negotiations are conducted. 
For those men who are at least moderately successful, however, they may 
find that the relative reproductive status at age 45 is a reverse of what it was 
premaritally vis-a-vis their wives. Women have long complained that a little 
bit of gray hair makes a man “mature” but may make a woman only look old. 
Some men capitalize on this difference and leave their first wives for a younger 
woman. Men, at a later age than woman, may be able to have a second family 
in this fashion. In this sense, a sort of serial monogamy does exist in our 
ostensibly monogamous society. Very successful (even older) men may make a 
point of taking (buying, in a sense) a beautiful, much younger wife, the 
so-called “trophy” wife, an ornament and proof of his status and power. Of 
course, when a younger woman marries a much older man, she has to take into 
account the likelihood that he may not survive to personally invest in offspring. 
This suggests that such marriages will occur most often when the man is 
wealthy, since he may be able to “invest” after his death through his wife’s 
inheritance of his estate. 
Of course, even a middle-aged wife whose status has declined while her 
husband’s has increased is not helpless in the negotiation of the marital quid 
pro quo. A patient, a depressed and anxious woman in her fifties, felt 
dominated by her successful husband, a banker. She was a homemaker, no 
longer as attractive, who had always worked hard raising the family and 
providing a satisfactory home life. She felt that he was having an affair and 
behaved as if being symptomatic was her only source of power. After being 
helped by antidepressant medication, she was able to see that she needed to 
question the quid pro quo that she had passively complied with. Despite the 
affair, he had depended on her to maintain their respectable middle-class home 
life and their relationships with other family members. By refusing to accept 
this arrangement, she renegotiated a quid pro quo where he had to give up the 
affair. 
This example illustrates a number of useful points. First, the quid pro quo 
is a dynamic process, subject to implicit and explicit renegotiation throughout 
a marriage. Second, both actual and perceived power and status are relevant. 
Thus, actual status will influence the number and quality of opportunities for 
other sexual partners or financial gain, but perceived status (about oneself) will 
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limit one’s ability to recognize and use effectively whatever opportunities one 
does, in fact, have. As mentioned earlier, this is where individual psychological 
characteristics or psychopathology become relevant. In this case, the wife 
failed to appreciate how the initial quid pro quo (where the husband was able 
to have an affair) required her collaboration and cooperation. When she 
realized this, she found that she did have some power and was able to force a 
renegotiation of the marital quid pro quo. Third, although this marital negotia- 
tion does not turn directly on differences in parental investment, the nature of 
the role differentiation and sources of power illustrated do flow indirectly from 
issues of investment, changes in reproductive status, and economic control. 
In view of these considerations, it may be worth speculating about their 
effects on recent changes in family structure that have occurred in this country. 
Specifically, how have the improved educational, occupational, and economic 
opportunities of women affected marital negotiations? 
In general, these opportunities should enhance the negotiating power of 
women, both by making them less financially dependent on others and, 
perhaps, by making possible a range of alternative mating and parenting 
strategies. New risks may accompany these strategies, however. For example, 
going to college and having a career outside the home may allow women to 
meet potential partners not otherwise available to them. They may be free to 
negotiate relationships that vary from the traditional forms urged by kin. When 
combined with neolocal residence and effective birth control, an unprecedented 
degree of independence from kin (and men in general) may be possible. On the 
other hand, a very independent woman may lose some of the benefits that kin 
have to offer, such as economic support or their assistance in enforcing marital 
commitments or in balancing the influence of in-laws. These costs are even 
more significant in view of the remarkably high level of parental investment 
expected in even middle-class families. 
This high level of expected investment means that men will still be valued 
for contributing to childbearing even when a woman has a career of her own. 
What will be the effect on the divorce rate if sufficient resources for childbear- 
ing can only be achieved with two wage earners? On one hand, this might be 
expected to lower the divorce rate because divorce might threaten the provision 
of needed resources. By contrast, one may expect higher levels of divorce and 
promiscuity where “the economic roles of women and men are similar, hence 
more easily substitutable” (Borgerhoff Mulder 1992). The direction of the 
effect for any particular woman will probably depend on several factors, such 
as the reliability of child support payments, the financial cost of divorce, the 
cost and availability of alternative caretakers (such as kin or day-care), and the 
number, quality, and accessibility of potential new partners. 
If a woman earns as much or more money than her husband, she may 
thereby increase her power and control in marital negotiations. Hill and Hill 
(1990) cite a variety of evidence that when women have sources of income or 
support other than their husband, divorce occurs more readily. As women 
increase their economic strength and independence, men may utilize behaviors 
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that try to re-establish their own control and dominance, such as physical abuse. 
Daly and Wilson (1988) have demonstrated that most spousal homicide occurs 
when men kill their wives because of jealousy or the wife’s actual or threatened 
desertion. Using physical abuse to control a woman may occur at any socioeco- 
nomic level, but seems most likely to be used by men who have few other 
means at their disposal to establish their dominance. This will be especially true 
for men of low or declining status. Abuse should also occur less often in 
middle- and upper-class marriages since those women may find it preferable to 
leave the marriage rather than submit to abuse. Higher status women may find 
it easier to leave because of their greater economic independence, better choice 
of alternative mates, and probable greater ability to use the legal system to their 
advantage (compared to lower-class women). A woman’s subjective sense of 
self-esteem or self-worth will affect her perception of how favorable a quid pro 
quo she will be able to negotiate. Note again that it is not just her actual status, 
but also her perception of her status and opportunities that will affect how she 
negotiates on her own behalf. When men find their power in a marriage 
decreasing because of a wife’s increasing status or income, they may react with 
depression or anger, instead of abuse. This can hardly be surprising, given that, 
in our society (as in many others), the value we place on a man is likely to be 
closely related to his occupational status. The role of a “house husband” does 
not seem likely to make very many men happy. 
It might be expected that marriages without children would have less 
conflict since parental investment is not an issue. Certainly, the absence of 
children removes a major source of marital conflict. However, it may still be 
associated with a higher divorce rate because the absence of children also 
removes a major motivation for reconciliation. 
Finally, what is the effect of affairs on the marital balance of power? This 
is quite complex. In an ostensibly monogamous society, having an extramarital 
affair is a refusal to honor expectations of fidelity and may signal the exercise 
or expression of power in a marriage. The relative status of the unfaithful 
spouse may determine whether the infidelity is overt or covert. In the example 
above, the banker could be fairly casual about concealing his affairs (so that 
his wife knew about some of them) because he had been largely able to dictate 
the terms of their quid pro quo. By contrast, another patient-married to a 
physician-reacted to her perception of low relative power and control in the 
marriage by having affairs. By having affairs, she was able to feel valued by 
and attractive to other men, which at least temporarily decreased her depressed 
mood. However, because of her feeling that she had little power in the 
marriage, she made every effort to keep her affairs secret. 
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
In-Laws 
Conflict over investment may be especially provoked by in-laws, who may 
advocate strongly for the interests of kin without feeling themselves at all 
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constrained by the compromises governing the husband and wife. The cultural 
values of the in-laws may well limit the exercise of choices that underlie 
negotiating strength. This may even happen to the detriment of kin. A family 
that opposes divorce or the independence of women may thereby rob their 
married daughter of a potentially strong negotiating position. (Premaritally, this 
may be just what the family wants if it is their goal to control who she 
marries.) A young couple may feel obliged to respect the wishes of in-laws 
either because of the need for financial support or the hope to inherit. Conflict 
over these matters is common and exists cross-culturally (Betzig 1989). 
Step-Children and Half Siblings 
The difficulties that step-children and half siblings introduce into a second 
marriage are common. Competition among children for parental 
investment-already intense among full siblings-will likely be even stronger 
between half siblings and greater still among step-siblings. The divergent 
reproductive interests of the parents will make it even more difficult to 
negotiate a satisfactory quid pro quo. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the marital therapy literature recognizes the importance of the quid 
pro quo in shaping the marital balance of power, it may benefit from further 
elaboration of the sources of marital power and the developmental changes that 
affect them. I have tried to show how ideas from both evolutionary theory and 
anthropology have something to offer in this regard. This is plainly an 
enormous and complex subject, and only the outlines of such an undertaking 
have been touched on here. 
The concept of reproductive status has been emphasized because it seems 
either underemphasized or absent in the marital literature. It is obvious that a 
variety of other personal strengths and weaknesses will also affect the outcome 
of marital negotiations. Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate that the 
relative reproductive status between husband and wife may change dramati- 
cally from premarital negotiations to those of married middle age. A special 
problem for women is that their greatest reproductive status occurs when they 
are relatively immature and least advantaged economically. This, when com- 
bined with widespread values concerning the independence of women, may 
lead them to make poor use of that status. The shift to greater male power after 
marriage is consistent with the feminist perspective that marriage is a better 
deal for husbands than for wives (Bernard 1982). 
Individual psychopathology may also have a pronounced influence on 
how effective a person is in these negotiations. Poor interpersonal skills, 
whether due to inhibitions, low self-esteem, poor understanding of social 
causality, negative expectations of relationships, or other cognitive and affec- 
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tive limitations, will limit the person’s ability to negotiate effectively. The 
ability to make good use of kin or other allies will also be important. 
But it is a central point of this paper that the forces which have been 
examined-those having to do with reproductive status, parental investment, 
certainty of paternity, intrasexual competition, and a negotiated balance of 
power-will have powerful effects in even psychologically healthy individuals. 
These themes help shape the general landscape of marital life and the quid pro 
quo. Understanding them is a step toward a socioecology of marriage. 
Some general implications for the treatment of individuals and couples 
troubled by marital conflict can be described. Some who complain of this 
conflict suffer from an unrealistic and historically modern expectation of 
marital harmony. They may be reassured, at least in part, that certain types of 
conflict are common, even expected, in the enormous reproductive undertaking 
of marriage. By looking at the reproductive problems facing men and women, 
one can appreciate the need for differing strategies for the sexes. This should 
enable the clinician to articulate unspoken assumptions about what is “proper” 
in married life, in terms of sex-role definition and sexual division of labor. 
Argument about what is “fair” may be dealt with by clear identification of the 
differing interests and contributions of each individual. The clinician will want 
to look closely at the apparent common goals of the couple, since subtle 
differences in terms of these goals may lead the couple to work at cross-pur- 
poses. This perspective lends a broader and more substantial theoretical footing 
to the use of quid pro quo in understanding negotiations between the sexes. 
I would like to thank Elizabeth Hill, Randolph Nesse, Alan Lloyd, Kathryn Robine, and two anony- 
mous reviewers for their helpful comments on this article. 
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